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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Trade Commission was created in 1914 with the authority
to identify and condemn “[u]nfair methods of competition.”1 The FTC,
originally referred to as an “interstate trade commission,” was part of
President Woodrow Wilson’s progressive campaign promise against big
business, and much of its support came from, frankly, anti-big-business
interest groups. Others really believed that comprehensive federal
regulation and even a federal incorporation act would have been superior to
the state corporate law system that we continue to have, but they settled on
the FTC as a compromise.2 The FTC Act creates a tribunal headed by five
* Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law, University of Iowa. Thanks to Christina
Bohannan for commenting on a draft. This paper was delivered as the first annual Bayard W. Heath
Lecture on antitrust, given at the University of Florida Levin College of Law , February 5, 2010.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). A later amendment added condemnation for “unfair or deceptive acts
or practices,” which refers to consumer protection concerns. Wheeler-Lea Act, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52
Stat. 111 (1938). The FTC also has only limited jurisdiction over nonprofit entities. See 1B PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 261b (3d ed. 2006).
2. See Robert E. Cushman, The Problem of the Independent Regulatory Commissions, in THE
PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH
STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 205, 210–11 (1937)
[hereinafter Problem]; ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 177–213
(1941) (chronicling the FTC’s early history). For a thoughtful retrospective by a recent chairman, see
generally Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present, and Future of Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade
Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 209 (2005). See also WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, THE FEDERAL TRADE
1
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Commissioners, not more than three of whom may be from the same
political party.3 Significantly, Congress chose initially not to create an
elaborate code of competitive business behavior.4 Rather, it took its cue
from the Sherman Act, which prohibited anticompetitive conduct in only
the most general terms. Indeed, the term “unfair methods of competition” is
even more general than the Sherman Act’s rather vague condemnation of
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade in § 15 or of
every person who shall “monopolize” in § 2.6
Read with the aid of nearly a century of hindsight, the term “unfair”
seems unfortunate, for it suggests that the Commission was concerned
more with business torts than with truly anticompetitive practices. Business
torts can encompass many kinds of deceptive or unfair conduct, often
without regard to anticompetitive consequences. Indeed, many of those
historically accused of business torts are not dominant firms bent on
monopoly at all, but rather small, undercapitalized or fly-by-night
companies that make their living by deceit or by free riding on the
investments of other firms.7
The FTC also has authority to enforce the Clayton Act,8 which includes
provisions that prohibit anticompetitive tying arrangements and exclusive
dealing,9 price discrimination,10 and mergers.11 The FTC does not have
explicit statutory authority to enforce the most important antitrust
provision, however, which is the Sherman Act. The Conference Report on
the FTC Act is not particularly helpful on the definition of the kinds of
conduct that the FTC Act reaches:
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair
practices. There is no limit to human inventiveness in this
field. . . . It is also practically impossible to define unfair
practices so that the definition will fit business of every sort in
COMMISSION
AT
100:
INTO
OUR
2ND
CENTURY
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/workshops/ftc100/docs/ftc100rpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC AT 100]; Symposium,
Federal Trade Commission 90th Anniversary Symposium, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 745 (2005); William E.
Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of the Federal Trade Commission, 49
ADMIN. L. REV. 915, 918-20 (1997); Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC: Concentration,
Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (2003).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006).
4. Problem, supra note 2, at 210–11.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
6. Id. § 2.
7. E.g., Mosler Safe Co. v. Ely-Norris Safe Co., 273 U.S. 132 (1927) (reversing a lower court
ruling in favor of a New Jersey manufacturer of safes against a New York safe manufacture for
misrepresenting the manufacturer of a safe); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)
(affirming an injunction initiated by the 950-newspaper Associated Press against 400-newspaper
International News Service for allegedly free riding on a competitor’s work and expense).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (2006).
9. Id. § 14.
10. Id. § 13.
11. Id. § 18.
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every part of this country. Whether competition is unfair or
not generally depends upon the surrounding circumstances of
the particular case. What is harmful under certain
circumstances may be beneficial under different
circumstances.12
The FTC is divided into a Bureau of Competition, which is concerned
with anticompetitive practices as defined most generally by the antitrust
laws, and a Bureau of Consumer Protection, which is concerned mainly
with different types of deceptive conduct, much of which is undertaken by
firms that have no prospect of attaining a monopoly.13 Our concern here is
entirely with the FTC as an antitrust—or at least as a “quasi-antitrust”
enforcement agency.
Today, the jurisdiction of the FTC over anticompetitive practices is well
established.14 Not only does the Commission have explicit power to enforce
the Clayton Act directly, but also the Supreme Court has held that the
FTC’s power to condemn “unfair methods of competition” covers
everything that the Sherman Act covers and goes even further to reach a
“penumbra” of practices that are not covered by the Sherman Act.
The view that the FTC can condemn practices because they are
anticompetitive, even though they do not fall within the literal coverage of
the Clayton or Sherman Acts, is historically justified.15 Indeed, the mindset
of the Congress that passed both the Clayton and FTC Acts in 1914 was
that the Supreme Court had been much too restrictive in its interpretation
of the Sherman Act16 and that some expansion was in order.
This Article argues that the FTC should expand its authority, within
limits, to reach conduct not addressed by the literal language of either the
Sherman or Clayton Acts. Nevertheless, the power to condemn undefined
practices that have been held not to violate the Sherman Act is hardly
uncontroversial.
II. THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST EXPANDING THE REACH OF
5 BEYOND THE SHERMAN ACT

§

A. Opposition to Expansion
The arguments against an expansive reach can be summarized as
12. H.R. REP. NO. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.).
13. See, e.g., FTC AT 100, supra note 2, at 29–30; Federal Trade Commission, FTC Bureau of
Consumer Protection, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/index.shtml (last visited May 14, 2010).
14. For a brief statement of the FTC’s jurisdiction, see Federal Trade Commission, Appendix 1—
Laws Enforced by the FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/opp/gpra/append1.shtm (last visited May 14, 2010).
15. See the detailed account of the legislative history in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405
U.S. 233, 239-41(1972). See also FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 693 (1948); FTC v. R.F. Keppel
& Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 310–12, 312 n.2 (1934); Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of
Competition” in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 233–34, 251,
271 (1980).
16. E.g., Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 13 (1912) (refusing to condemn patent tie).
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follows. The Sherman Act is extremely open ended in its identification of
anticompetitive practices. Section 1 of the Sherman Act reaches “[e]very
contract, combination . . . conspiracy” among multiple firms that is in
“restraint of trade.”17 These terms can refer to virtually any practice that has
the effect of reducing output and raising price—or those activities that are
“anticompetitive” under the ordinary definitions of neoclassical economics.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act reaches naked cartels of competitors, vertical
agreements, joint ventures, and many mergers, provided that the conduct
requires the coordinated efforts of two or more independent economic
actors. Further, § 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits firms from monopolizing
or attempting or conspiring to monopolize.18 This broad prohibition reaches
the full range of practices by which firms that are already dominant maintain
their monopolistic positions, as well as all practices by which a firm that is
not yet a monopolist might realistically seek to become one. It is hard to
imagine a practice that is “anticompetitive” in some meaningful sense of
that word and yet is not reachable under these provisions. As Judge Posner
once observed in a different context, “Our law is not rich in alternative
concepts of monopolistic abuse[.]”19 Reaching beyond what the Sherman
Act reaches is likely to condemn practices that are not economically
harmful and that might even benefit consumers.
Indeed, historical experience provides considerable warrant for that
position. When the Supreme Court has permitted the FTC to reach beyond
existing antitrust law to condemn practices as anticompetitive, the FTC has
ended up condemning practices that were not anticompetitive at all, by any
sensible definition. For example, in the Brown Shoe decision, the Supreme
Court upheld an FTC order condemning exclusive dealing by a shoe
manufacturer where there was no realistic expectation of harm to
competition.20 The Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s conclusion
that the FTC was required to show competitive harm. Rather, the
Commission has power to “arrest trade restraints in their incipiency.”21
Further, the Court observed that this power “is particularly well established
with regard to trade practices which conflict with the basic policies of the
Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not actually

17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
18. Id. § 2.
19. USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussing an expansive
definition of patent “misuse” that might go beyond antitrust principles). On this issue, see generally
Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure (U. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 09-41,
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1474407.
20. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966). The issue was contested in
numerous earlier decisions, with several leaning toward an interpretation of the FTC Act that was more
or less limited to the coverage of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647–
49 (1931); FTC v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 260 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1923); FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261
U.S. 463, 474-75 (1923); FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 428-29 (1920); cf. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–44 (1972) (finding FTC authority was not limited to the spirit and letter of antitrust laws).
21. Brown Shoe, 384 U.S. at 322.
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violate these laws.”22 As the Supreme Court would observe two decades
later, the “standard of ‘unfairness’ under the FTC Act is, by necessity, an
elusive one, encompassing not only practices that violate the Sherman Act
and the other antitrust laws, but also practices that the Commission
determines are against public policy for other reasons.”23
One problem with decisions such as Brown Shoe is that not only was the
challenged activity competitively harmless, but it also did not seem to
qualify for condemnation under the FTC’s consumer protection theory
either. On the latter point, the practice was not deceptive and did not
obviously injure consumers in any way. Indeed, the biggest beneficiaries of
such decisions were typically rivals who were injured by more efficient
distribution practices. So the decision injured rather than benefitted
consumers.24
B. Supporting Expansion of FTC Authority
On the other hand, the rationales for expansive coverage are quite
persuasive as a whole and may even be overwhelming. Although, not every
rationale that has been offered is equally persuasive.
The rationales for the expansionist view that § 5 of the FTC Act reaches
beyond the Sherman Act are as follows. First, the FTC Act may be a way to
import an “incipiency” concern into the Sherman Act that is present in the
language of the Clayton Act but not in the Sherman Act itself.
Second, some cartel-like conduct is not reachable under § 1 of the
Sherman Act because that provision’s requirement of a “contract,
combination, or conspiracy” in restraint of trade cannot be met. That is, the
firms may be able to achieve cartel-like results, as in an oligopoly, without
actually agreeing among themselves in any way that satisfies the Sherman
Act agreement requirement. By contrast, the FTC Act’s prohibition of
22. Id. at 321; see also A. Everette MacIntyre & Joachim J. Volhard, The Federal Trade
Commission and Incipient Unfairness, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 407, 435–36 (1973).
23. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S.447, 454 (1986) (citation omitted).
24. See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTITRUST
L.J. 761, 766 (2005) (making similar criticisms). Other expansionist decisions under both the Sherman
Act and the Clayton Act include: FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341, 348–50 (1968); FTC v.
Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 228–31 (1968); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577–78
(1967); FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1967); FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S.
637, 645–47 (1966); Atl. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 367–69 (1965); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive
Co., 380 U.S. 374, 386–92 (1965); FTC v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594–97 (1965); FTC
v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46, 48–49 (1965); FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 513–18
(1963); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 543–44 (1960); FTC v. Travelers Health Ass’n,
362 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1960); FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 388-89 (1959); FTC v. Simplicity
Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55, 69–71 (1959); FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394
(1953) (“The ‘Unfair methods of competition’, [sic] which are condemned by § 5(a) of the Act, are not
confined to those that were illegal at common law or that were condemned by the Sherman
Act.”)(internal citation omitted); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC., 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941)
(“[I]t was the object of the Federal Trade Commission Act to reach not merely in their fruition but also
in their incipiency combinations which could lead to these and other trade restraints and practices
deemed undesirable.”).
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“unfair methods of competition” does not contain any explicit agreement
requirement. Third, § 1 of the Sherman Act does not contain an “attempt”
provision, and the less categorical language of the FTC Act might be used
to read an attempt doctrine into the law of concerted action.
Fourth, in § 2 of the Sherman Act, the prohibition of monopolizing
conduct is narrower than the prohibitions used in other countries. For
example, the Competition Law of the European Union does not speak of
conduct that monopolizes a market but rather of “abuse . . . of a dominant
position.”25 The difference can become quite important when conduct is not
reasonably calculated to maintain or create a monopoly but rather
represents the dominant firm’s attempt to use its power in some
complementary or collateral market in which monopoly cannot be proven to
result. From time to time, U.S. courts, including the Supreme Court, have
tinkered with the idea of a “leverage” theory, or a theory that taking
advantage of one’s monopoly position by causing harm in a collateral
market should be unlawful.26 The current Supreme Court has rejected such
claims.27 However, the FTC Act’s “unfair methods of competition” seem
well suited for such applications, provided that they are limited to situations
in which competitive harm is likely.28
Because it is a regulatory agency, the FTC has some structural and
procedural advantages over a traditional federal court.29 The most
important of these are that 1) the FTC uses experts as magistrates and
ultimate decision makers rather than generalist judges; further, its decisionmaking is largely limited to anticompetitive and unfair trade practices; 2)
the FTC operates under the federal Administrative Procedure Act, which
permits more flexible rules of procedure and evidence than traditional
judicial processes; and 3) in an FTC proceeding, there is no jury. In
addition, the Supreme Court’s recent Twombly decision30 placed heavy
25. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 82, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C340) 3;
see also Herbert Hovenkamp, The Legal Periphery of Dominant Firm Conduct 5 (U. Iowa Legal
Studies Research Paper, No. 07-21, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1014426.
26. See discussion of this leverage theory infra Part III.C.
27. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–
11 (2004); Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 454-55 (1993); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274–76 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding that the use of monopoly power
obtained in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another violates the Sherman Act); see
generally 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 652 (3d ed. 2008).
28. In Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980), the court rejected an
FTC claim that a monopoly publisher of airline schedules violated § 5 by refusing to publish the
schedules of small commuter airlines, when the publisher did not operate in the airline market and did
not have any prospect of gaining power there. Id. at 926–27.
29. See William H. Page, The FTC’s Procedural Advantage in Discovering Concerted Action
1–3 (U. of Fla. Levin College of Law, Research Paper No. 2009-10), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1342783; William E. Kovacic, The Identification
and Proof of Horizontal Agreements Under the Antitrust Laws, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 24–26
(1993).
30. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
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burdens on a plaintiff pleading an antitrust conspiracy and seeking
discovery. By contrast, the FTC should be able to proceed with an
investigation on a more general, reasonable-belief standard. This can be a
particular advantage in conspiracy cases where the evidence has typically
been concealed. As Professor William Page has observed, “[T]o the extent
that courts do not allow sufficient pre-answer discovery, the FTC might fill
the procedural gap in appropriate cases by exercising its administrative
powers of investigation.”31
In addition, The FTC Act cannot be enforced by private parties.32 This,
it turns out, is a question of some complexity, but it goes far beyond the
traditional concerns of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Under existing
law, if an antitrust violation is found in a fully adjudicated case brought by
the U.S. Justice Department in a federal court, that decision can be given
prima facie effect in a subsequent lawsuit filed by private parties; however,
this provision does not apply to findings of the FTC.33 Further, principles of
nonmutual “offensive” collateral estoppel generally hold that a defendant
gets a single bite at the apple. Therefore, after a defendant’s condemnation
in an antitrust proceeding, those issues that were fully litigated and
necessary to the outcome are precluded in a later action brought by a
private party. The offensive collateral estoppel application of proceedings
brought under the FTC Act is mired in some ambiguity. However, one thing
is clear: when the FTC is not proceeding under the antitrust laws at all, but
rather is taking advantage of the FTC Act’s reach to conduct that is not
even covered by the antitrust laws, then there is no preclusive effect
whatsoever.
Indeed, when the FTC brings an action not covered explicitly by
antitrust laws, the result could go the other way. For example, an FTC
finding that particular conduct violates the FTC Act but not the antitrust
laws could be given some weight—although not preclusive effect—in a
subsequent private action brought under the antitrust laws.34 As FTC
Commissioners Jon Leibowitz and J. Thomas Rosch recently observed in a
statement accompanying the announcement of the FTC’s complaint against
Intel, the action was brought under “the stand-alone [§] 5 [of the FTC Act]
unfair method of competition claim because liability under that standard has
the potential to protect consumers while at the same time limiting Intel’s
susceptibility to private treble damages cases.”35
Another contrast is in available remedies. Remedies for violations of the
FTC Act are typically limited to injunctions (cease and desist orders)36 that
31. See Page, supra note 29 at 5.
32. Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 754 F.2d 907, 912 n.5 (11th Cir. 1985), abrogated by760 F.2d
1168, 1174 n.5 (11th Cir. 1985); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 988 –92 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
33. 15 U.S.C. §16 (2006).
34. On these various possibilities, see 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST
LAW ¶ 319a (3d ed. 2006).
35. Statement of Chairman Leibowitz and Commissioner Rosch, In the Matter of Intel
Corporation, Docket No. 9341, http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelchairstatement.pdf.
36. This is not invariably the case. The FTC has sometimes obtained remedies akin to fines or
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prohibit the repetition of certain types of conduct; as a result, they do not
encounter the problems of overreaching that are inherent in the antitrust
treble damage system.37 A great deal of unwarranted expansion in antitrust
during the middle part of the 20th Century occurred as a result of privateplaintiff actions.38
The last two propositions are particularly weighty given that so much of
the criticism directed at the antitrust laws over the past four decades has
pertained to the overdeterrence that results from a system that rewards
private plaintiffs with treble damages plus attorneys fees and costs.39 When
the FTC is explicitly reaching beyond the Sherman Act in order to condemn
anticompetitive conduct, subsequent private overdeterrence based on these
actions should not be an issue.
III. ADDRESSING LACUNAE IN ANTITRUST COVERAGE?
I believe there is serious merit to many of these propositions. The FTC
should expand its reach to bring in some conduct that does not fall within
the coverage of the Sherman and Clayton Acts as currently interpreted by
the Supreme Court. In doing so, however, the FTC needs to be mindful of
one thing that often eluded it in1960s-era decisions such as Brown Shoe;
namely, the practices that it condemns must really be “anticompetitive” in a
meaningful sense. That is, there must be a basis for thinking that the
practice either does or will lead to reduced output and higher consumer
prices or lower quality in the affected market. Expansive readings of the
FTC Act should not unreasonably blur the line between competition
concerns and consumer protection concerns; and most importantly,
consumers—and not competitors—must be the ultimate protected class.
With that, I offer a few observations, as well as some examples from
both past and present FTC actions.
A. Attacking Monopoly in its Incipiency

damages, including “disgorgement” of improperly obtained monopoly gains. E.g., FTC v. Mylan Labs.,
Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36–37 (D.D.C. 1999) (disgorgement); see also FTC, Policy Statement on
Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases (approved July 25, 2003),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/disgorgementfrn.htm. In addition, the FTC has issued some mandatory
orders, such as for compulsory licensing of patents. See, e.g., Charles Pfizer & Co. v. FTC, 401 F.2d
574, 585–86 (6th Cir. 1968); cf. FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming the ordering
disgorgement of monies obtained through false or deceptive advertising).
37. Cf. Posner, supra note 24, at 766.
38. See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modern
Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 26–42 (1999); Roger D. Blair, Jill Boylston
Herndon & John E. Lopatka, Resale Price Maintenance and the Private Antitrust Plaintiff, 83 WASH.
U. L.Q. 657, 663–73 (2005); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1539, 1552–68 (1989) (reviewing how the antitrust injury requirement can be used to
alter substantive antitrust law); see generally William H. Page & Roger D. Blair, Controlling the
Competitor Plaintiff in Antitrust Litigation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 111 (1992) (reviewing a study of private
antitrust lawsuits).
39. See sources cited supra note 38.
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First, “incipiency” concerns are legitimate, provided that we really do
mean “incipiency” and know the criteria of proof. The word “incipient”
generally means something such as “starting to manifest itself.” The term is
useful in antitrust analysis if it is limited to situations where monopoly or
collusion really is in prospect and the tribunal is in a position to solve the
problem. That is, it should function something like the “dangerous
probability of success” requirement in the law of attempt to monopolize.40
Under that law, conduct by a firm that is not yet a monopolist can be
condemned, but only if there is a “dangerous probability” that this conduct,
if permitted to run its course, would result in the forbidden monopoly. In
such cases, the social savings of identifying and condemning such conduct
early can be considerable, just as they can be when the police intercept an
incipient arsonist before—rather than after—he lights his match or when a
doctor detects and treats cancer at an early stage. One of the problems of
older FTC actions, such as the one against Brown Shoe, was that monopoly
simply was not in prospect at all. What the FTC identified as unfair was
nothing more than an efficient retail distribution system that made it more
difficult for traditional, higher cost independent retailers to sell shoes.41 The
beneficiaries were small independent retailers, clearly not consumers. Very
likely, the practice would never have resulted in a monopoly of anything,
although it might eventually have resulted in other shoe manufacturers
attaining the same efficiencies by integrating vertically into retailing.
B. Cartel-Like Behavior
Second, there is serious theoretical promise to the notion that § 5 of the
FTC Act can be used to reach collusion-like behavior that does not satisfy
the “contract, combination, or conspiracy” provisions of § 1 of the Sherman
Act. The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have been dealing with
this issue for three quarters of a century. In its 1939 Interstate Circuit
decision, an action brought under the Sherman Act by the U.S. Justice
Department, the Supreme Court found an inference of an agreement
supported by parallel conduct despite no evidence of actual communication
among the firms.42
Significantly, the conduct in that case was in response to an explicit
invitation from a buyer, and the Court concluded that compliance by each
individual member would have been irrational except on the supposition
that they were acting in concert.43 The Supreme Court went even further in
the American Tobacco case in 1946, holding that an agreement could be

40. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1993); Swift & Co. v. United
States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
41. See generally FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966). See supra text accompanying
notes 20–22.
42. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 225–26 (1939). For a recent application by
the FTC, see Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000) (sustaining an FTC finding of
unlawful collusive conduct).
43. See 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1426 (3d ed. 2010) .
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inferred from parallel pricing behavior.44 Since that time, however, the
general trend of Supreme Court decisions has been more restrictive,45 and
some language in the 2009 Twombly decision suggests that there must be
evidence of an actual time and place at which an illicit agreement
occurred.46
One of the problems in addressing cartel-like behavior is a disjunction
between the language of the Sherman Act and the economic theory of
oligopoly. The Sherman Act’s “contract, combination or conspiracy”
requirement reflects a lawyer’s view of collusion and an essentially common
law conception that a cartel requires a contract or agreement in the
common law sense. Indeed, virtually all of the law of contracts in restraint
of trade prior to the passage of the Sherman Act involved explicit
agreements.47 In sharp contrast, economists tend to see collusion in the
language of “games,” or strategies, rather than agreements.48
This economic theory has gone through considerable transition over the
years. Historically, it was strongly structural and saw a correlation between
performance, or pricing, in a market and such factors as the number of
firms, their size disparities, and entry barriers.49 Relying on this theory,
antitrust policy makers once believed that concentrated industries, which
are markets that contain a small number of firms, were structurally
incapable of behaving anti-competitively.50 As a result, some proposed that
the firms in such markets should be broken up so as to increase the amount
of competition. Indeed, in the 1960s, Congress once entertained passing a
“concentrated industries” act that would have done so.51 However, with the
44. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809–10 (1946); see also United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275–76 (1942); 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 1427, 1433b (3d ed. 2010).
45. E.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582–86 (1986)
(refusing to find a conspiracy from parallel behavior when other evidence suggested that the conspiracy
was implausible).
46. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007); see also William H. Page,
Twombly and Communication: The Emerging Definition of Concerted Action Under the New
Pleading Standards, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 439 (2009); see generally Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Pleading Problem in Antitrust Cases and Beyond, 95 IOWA L. REV. BULL.(forthcoming 2010)
(discussing Twombly’s requirement to plead all essential facts with specificity).
47. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937, chs.
20–21 (1991); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74
IOWA L. REV. 1019, 1029-1041 (1989).
48. See 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶ 1428–36 (3d ed.
2010); W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION
AND ANTITRUST ch. 6 (4th ed. 2005).
49. For a history of the theory and its relevance to antitrust policy in the United States, see
Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis, 1890-1955, 94 MINN. L. REV. 311
(2009).
50. Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 663–64 (1962); see generally CARL KAYSEN
& DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 110–19(1959). Turner was head of the Antitrust Division
from 1965 to 1968.
51. The provision was proposed in the Neal Report, which was commissioned by President
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rise of the Chicago School, the theory of oligopoly behavior de-emphasized
structure as such and began to look more at conduct, particularly at
“facilitating practices” that might make markets more conducive to cartellike behavior.52 Within that theory two things are true: first, one does not
need explicit communication or even an “agreement” in the common law
sense to produce interdependent action; and second, the nonexistence of
actual communication is not necessarily a good indicator of the dividing line
between pro- and anticompetitive agreements. Indeed, communication may
be an indicator that methods of coordination that do not require
communication are ineffective because the industry is excessively prone to
competition.
Responding to these developments in economic theory, the FTC has
attempted to use § 5 of the FTC Act to pursue collusion-like activity. More
particularly, the Commission has sought to obtain cease and desist orders
against “facilitating practices,” whether developed by explicit agreement or
not, such as delivered pricing, which creates cartel-facilitating homogeneity
among sellers, or various practices that tend to make prices stick,53 thus
making price cuts more difficult. Among these are so-called most-favorednation clauses, which require price cuts to be given retroactively to
previous customers,54 and systematic use of advance price announcements,
or delivered pricing or basing-point pricing provisions that eliminate
competition on the basis of location.55 In addition to looking at particular
practices, the FTC is also in a position to use statistical analysis of pricing
patterns or buyer-seller alignments that can provide evidence of collusion.
These efforts have frankly not been met with a great deal of success, but
I do not believe they should be abandoned. Indeed, there are a large number
of advantages to using the FTC to pursue collusion-like behavior. First is
the obvious one that the “unfair methods of competition” formulation in the
FTC Act does not contain an explicit agreement requirement. Then, there is
always the fact of agency fact-finding expertise. Third are limitations on
private actions and remedy.
A significant problem of pursuing collusive behavior in ambiguous
Lyndon B. Johnson and published in 1969. See Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust
Policy, 115 CONG. REC. 11, 13890 (1969), reprinted in Herbert Hovenkamp, The Neal Report and the
Crisis in Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 219 (2009).
52. E.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY ch. 5 (1968); Richard A. Posner,
Oligoply and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1566–69 (1969);
Richard A. Posner, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 903, 905–06 (1976); George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 44-45
(1964). The issues are developed more fully in HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE
32–35, 128–34 (2005). See also William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust:
Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221, 1223, 1235–37
(1989); William H. Page, Communication and Concerted Action, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 412–13
(2007); Page, supra note 46, at 442–44.
53. E.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139–42 (2d Cir. 1984); Boise
Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 1980) (delivered pricing).
54. Dupont, 729 F.2d at 130, 142.
55. Boise, 637 F.2d at 575.
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situations is false positives. Although overcharge damages are difficult to
prove, the threat of treble damages suits could serve to deter
precompetitive conduct. The least costly way to pursue facilitating practices
or collusion-like behavior in the absence of explicit evidence of agreement
is for the FTC to identify anticompetitive practices and then condemn them
with cease and desist orders.56 In that case, the social cost of a false positive
is the loss of the market’s ability to employ the practice that has been
enjoined. For example, basing point or delivered pricing might be collusive,
but it might also be competitively harmless. An injunction against it will do
no more than force the firms to adopt some alternative practice, and firms
are generally quite adept at doing this. The caveat, of course, is that the
order itself must not be anticompetitive.
C. Conduct Analogous to Abuse of Dominant Position
Third, expanding FTC authority could reach negative actions outside a
firm’s primary market, which is sometimes called the “monopoly
leveraging” theory in U.S. antitrust law. Beginning with the Griffith
decision in 194857 and famously reiterated by the Second Circuit in its
Berkey Photo decision in 1979,58 some courts have suggested that a firm
that has monopoly power in one market might use that power to attain a
competitive advantage or cause consumer harm in a collateral market even
if the tribunal cannot establish monopolization of the second market.59 In its
1992 Kodak decision, the Supreme Court indicated that it might still adhere
to such a theory,60 but a year later, in Spectrum Sports, it largely rejected
the theory61 and reiterated that rejection in the Trinko case in 2004.62
Today, it seems quite clear that § 2 of the Sherman Act does not
contemplate a monopoly leveraging claim.63 However, European
competition law is to the contrary. Article 82 does not require
56. Cf. William H. Page, Facilitating Practices and Concerted Action Under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act (working paper, May 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst
ract_id=1117667 (focusing mainly on Sherman Act, although with some discussion of FTC cases, and
noting that many facilitating practices are beneficial to consumers).
57. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107–09 (1948).
58. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979).
59. Id. (approving, in principle, the proposition that “the use of monopoly power attained in one
market to gain a competitive advantage in another is a violation of § 2, even if there has not been an
attempt to monopolize the second market. It is the use of economic power that creates the liability”).
60. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992) “The Court has
held many times that power gained through some natural and legal advantage such as a patent,
copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if ‘a seller exploits his dominant position in one
market to expand his empire into the next.’” Id. (external citation omitted).
61. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) (“The concern that § 2 might
be applied so as to further anticompetitive ends is plainly not met by inquiring only whether the
defendant has engaged in ‘unfair’ or ‘predatory’ tactics.”).
62. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 415 n.4
(2004) (citing Spectrum Sports for proposition that a § 2 offense requires either monopolization or a
dangerous probability of achieving it in the market in question).
63. See 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 652 (3d ed. 2007).
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“monopolization” but rather “abuse . . . of a dominant position.”64 This
formulation clearly contemplates conduct by which a monopolist takes
unreasonable advantage of its position in one market in order to cause
competitive harm in a second market. Such rules can be particularly
important in dominated networks, which are markets that have stringent
compatibility, or interoperability, requirements but that also have dominant
firms.
A case in point is the most recent European decision ordering Microsoft
to share server protocols with rivals.65 Even if Microsoft’s actions did not
create a monopoly in the server market, they considerably reduced ex ante
incentives to invest. The record showed that independent developers had
entered and opened the third-party market for email and internet servers
first, using server operating systems that were compatible with Windows,
which was installed on the computers attached to the network. Later on,
however, Microsoft entered the server market itself and then began
withholding technical information necessary to make rival servers fully
interoperable with Windows. The result was to place the rival providers at a
substantial disadvantage to Microsoft’s own servers. Independent firms
wishing to invest in network markets that are dominated by a single firm
need to have some assurance that, once their investment succeeds, the
dominant firm will not capture it from them.66
Once again, the open ended “unfair methods of competition” language
64. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 82, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C340) 3.
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so
far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage,
have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Id. See Hovenkamp, supra note 25, at 1 n.2.
65. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-1, paras. 30, 47–48 available at
http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/gettext.pl?lang=en&num=79929082T19040201&doc=T&ouv
ert=T&seance=ARRET (finding that Microsoft controlled both primary operating system and software
for its own servers and requiring Microsoft to share protocols with rivals who provided competing
server software).
66. See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and Section Two of the Sherman
Act, 91 B.U. L. REV. ___ (2010).
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of the FTC Act would permit recognition of an action akin to “abuse of
dominance” under European law. Of course, that is not the same thing as
saying that such actions are good policy. Conduct in a secondary market
that falls short of threatening monopoly there can be competitively harmful,
but the harm to competition must be apparent.
Once again, limiting such actions to a regulatory agency such as the
FTC seems sensible. In a network market such as the one where Microsoft
operates, spillovers into collateral markets are very common and some
injury is inevitable. Permitting private plaintiff actions could greatly increase
the cost of operating such networks. The prosecutorial discretion of an
agency rather than private incentives seems better suited to confine
enforcement to truly serious situations, and the remedial limitation to a
cease and desist order will limit the cost of false positives.
IV. THE FTC ACT AND THE INTEL CASE
One recent FTC complaint has been widely touted as an opportunity for
the Commission to interpret § 5 of the FTC Act more broadly than the
Sherman Act. That is the action brought against Intel, mainly for injuries in
the market for microprocessors (CPUs) and graphics processors (GPUs)
for desktop and laptop computer operating systems.67 The complaint is
wide ranging and covers a number of practices, including so-called loyalty
discounts, bundled discounts, cajoling customers into staying exclusively
with Intel as a supplier, giving of false information concerning Intel
microprocessor performance, designing a software compiler in such a way
as to retard the performance of rivals’ processors, and other practices. The
relief that the FTC requests is equally far ranging, and much of it is
consistent with the recommendations offered here. For example, the FTC
alleges that Intel induced various firms to develop technology along certain
paths and then later denied interoperability between that technology and
Intel’s CPUs.68
A. The FTC’s Substantive Case Against Intel
I want to focus briefly on the claims concerning Intel’s pricing and
67. Complaint at 2, In re Intel Corp., No. 9341 (FTC Dec. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf (to the extent it is relevant, the author was
consulted by Intel in a prior proceeding before the Korean Fair Trade Commission in 2007).
Increasingly, GPUs are being used as substitutes for CPUs. As a result, GPU development threatens
Intel’s CPU market share. Intel’s principal competitor in the GPU market is Nvidia. Intel’s share of the
CPU market is alleged to be 75%–85% with revenues consistently exceeding 80%. See id. at 2. Its
share of the GPU market is alleged to be in excess of 50%. See id at 3–4. “Compilers” are programs
that turn source files, written in human-readable programming language, into machine-executable files.
See BJARNE STROUSTRUP, THE C++ PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE, 197–98 (3d ed. 2003); Reiffin v.
Microsoft Corp. 214 F.3d 1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (describing function of compilers). Under
appropriate circumstances, product designs created so as to degrade rivals’ products without improving
one’s own violate § 2. See, e.g., C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1369–72 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
68. Complaint, supra note 67, at 4.
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discount practices and, in particular, on the particular forms of relief the
FTC is seeking. The FTC’s contemplated relief may lead the FTC down the
same unfortunate road it travelled in the 1970s and earlier, when the FTC
condemned practices that really were not anticompetitive. In the process
the actions benefitted competitors but caused consumers more harm than
good.
Loyalty discounts, or rebates, are discounts that a customer can obtain
by sticking with a particular supplier. For example, a manufacturer might
agree with a customer that the price of a product is $100 per unit but that
the customer will get a 10% rebate at the end of the year if it purchases at
least 80% of its needs of this product from the seller rather than a
competitor. Sometimes the discounts are staged, such as a 10% discount if
one purchases 90% of its needs, or a 5% discount if one purchases 80% of
its needs. Loyalty discounts can have two quite different effects. First, they
can make it more difficult for rivals to compete, given that the discounted
price is lower than the full price. Second, they tend to increase the
discounting seller’s output by guaranteeing more sales to each customer
made subject to the discount plan. Exclusion can be a bad thing under some
circumstances, but output increases are typically a good thing. The problem
is sorting them out.
First, it is important to distinguish between above-cost and below-cost
discounts. No one makes money in the long run by selling something at
below cost, so a discount that drives the price of a product below its cost
must have an explanation. Below-cost discounts can be intended to drive
rivals out of the market so that the dominant firm can then raise its price to
monopoly levels. Some of the allegations in the FTC’s complaint are that
Intel engaged in below-cost discounting with the probability that it could
later recoup any losses that it suffered.69
However, what the complaint means by “below cost” discounts is not
entirely clear. The references to costs in the complaint appear to be to
“bundled” discounts and may mean no more than that one of the products
in the bundle is priced at less than the cost of that particular product. But
many bundled sales contain a “below cost” component in this sense and are
nevertheless well above cost when one considers the entire bundle. For
example, if a car dealer offers a price with a $1,000 markup and then tells a
reluctant customer that she will add in a $400 stereo for $300 more, one
might say that the price of the stereo is “below cost.” However, the
automobile manufacturer is still earning $900 on the package of car and the
stereo.70 Further, the dealer is unlikely to sell the stereo for $300 without
the car, which would be a below-cost sale. In such circumstances, one
expects to see both dominant and nondominant car dealers selling cars
without the stereos when they are able to and selling them with the stereos,
or some equivalent, when they have hard-bargaining customers. Both sets
of sales are profitable, although the first group is more profitable than the
69. Id. at 4 –5.
70. On the analysis of such bundled discounts, see 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 749 (3d ed. 2007).

16

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

second. That is how competitive markets work; the strategy increases the
car dealers’ sales and their profits without excluding anyone.
In another part of the complaint, the FTC accuses Intel of selling to
some customers at a price that might be sufficient to cover its variable cost
but not its fixed, or sunk costs.71 However, once fixed costs have been
incurred, any price above variable—or production—costs is generally
profitable, and costs per unit go down as output goes up. If condemning
such pricing is what the FTC has in mind, then it may end up condemning
procompetitive behavior.
The FTC’s Notice of Contemplated Relief appears to prohibit some
above-cost loyalty discounts.72 This could invite a clash with the Sherman
Act. At least since the early 1990s, the Supreme Court has been extremely
restrictive in its treatment of above-cost pricing policies, repeatedly holding
that prices cannot be unlawful under the antitrust laws unless they are
below some measure of cost. This was true of orthodox predatory pricing
in the Brooke Group decision in 1993,73 again, more recently, of alleged
predatory buying in the Weyerhaeuser decision,74 and of the so-called price
squeeze in the linkLine decision.75 Taken together, these decisions strongly
indicate that the Supreme Court will not permit § 2 of the Sherman Act to
be used to condemn pricing policies where the prices are above cost,76 and
that is how most lower courts, as well as the FTC in some cases, have
interpreted them.77
71. Complaint, supra note 67, at 9. A sunk cost is one that has been invested up front and that
cannot be recovered. For example, research and development costs leading up to production of a
microprocessor are typically sunk costs. Some fixed costs are not sunk; for example, 100 acres of
farmland is a fixed cost for the farmer because his or her mortgage must be paid whether or not the
farmer grows anything on the land. However, the investment is typically not a sunk cost because the
farmer can recover the investment by reselling the land.
72. Complaint, supra note 67, at 19–20.
73. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 243 (1993).
74. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 326 (2007).
75. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109, 1123 (2009).
76. Brooke Group Ltd. was a Robinson-Patman Act suit, but the Supreme Court made clear that
it was applying Sherman Act principles. 509 U.S. at 219–20, 221.
77. E.g., Doe v. Abbott Labs., 571 F.3d 930, 934-35 (9th Cir. 2009) (bundled discounts);
Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 901 (9th Cir. 2008); Concord Boat Corp. v.
Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1059–63 (8th Cir. 2000) (requiring that loyalty discounts be below
cost to violate the Sherman Act). The FTC itself has noted the problem in pricing cases. See, e.g., In re
General Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204 (1984), where the Commission refused to condemn alleged
predatory pricing in a competitively structured market, concluding that while its own powers went
beyond those of courts, it was not wise to disregard structural requirements that the courts had imposed
in predatory pricing cases:
The proscription against attempted monopolization in Section 2 of the Sherman Act
does not require a showing of monopoly power or injury to competition—a
dangerous probability is sufficient. We do not believe this standard should be
changed when a case is brought under Section 5. To distinguish between an attempt
to monopolize and an incipient attempt on the basis of potential market power is to
engage in such fine distinctions as to challenge the legal philosopher, let alone the
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Arguments have been made that above-cost loyalty discounts can be
anticompetitive because they tend to exclude firms with higher costs or
deprive them of economies of scale that would permit them to compete at
the same level.78 However, most U.S. courts have rejected those arguments
on grounds of both practicality and principle.
As a matter of practicality, economies of scale are notoriously difficult
to measure, and it is virtually impossible to proclaim a particular rate of
output as one where all scale economies have been exhausted. As a matter
of principle, a contrary rule turns the dominant firm into a watchdog,
limiting its own sales in order to protect rivals who may have higher costs;
indeed, in some cases, it may even require a firm to develop information
about its rivals’ costs or else risk antitrust liability. Further, a rule
condemning above-cost pricing under the Sherman Act would invite
countless lawsuits from competitors unhappy about a dominant firm’s
aggressive pricing.
To be sure, the FTC has some of the same advantages here as in other
areas. It may be a more accurate fact finder, and we would not have to
worry about dozens of follow on private plaintiff cases claiming that abovecost discounts are anti-competitive. But the problem remains that we want
firms to compete hard, and each firm knows its own costs far better than it
knows the costs of rivals. Forcing firms to charge higher prices in order to
protect less efficient rivals produces immediate consumer harm; so a
tribunal that is going to condemn such a practice must be dead certain that
it will not be doing more harm than good.
B. The FTC’s Requested Remedies
While the FTC’s Notice of Contemplated Relief in the Intel case
contains some ambiguity, it seems to contemplate the elimination of many
above-cost discounts and to force the firm to raise prices to levels clearly in
excess of variable costs, explicitly including a fixed cost component.79
However, the complaint does not indicate how this component will be
measured. Orders of this type will lead immediately to higher prices.
Whether they are predictably competitive in the longer run because they
permit competitors to survive or even enter is a different question, and
competitor trying to conform its conduct to the law. If the conduct at issue here
cannot reach the early threshold of doubt under the Sherman Act, we will not
condemn it under the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Id. at 365–66; see generally In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669 (1978) (condemning pricing policies
where at least some of the prices were above average variable cost).
78. E.g., Einer Elhauge, How Loyalty Discounts Can Perversely Discourage Discounting, 5 J.
COMP. L. & ECON. 189, 193 (2009); Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the
Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 452 (2009); Nicholas Economides & Ioannis
Lianos, The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in the United States in the
Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 544 (2009); Nicholas Economides,
Loyalty/Requirement Rebates and the Antitrust Modernization Commission: What Is the Appropriate
Liability Standard?, 54 ANTITRUST BULL. 259, 268 n.22, (2009).
79. Complaint, supra note 67, at 19–23.
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answering it requires extraordinary knowledge of the situation and
predictive skill.
There are probably very good and precompetitive reasons for Intel’s
loyalty discount practices, although not for all of the practices alleged in the
FTC’s complaint. Microprocessors are products that are characterized by
high up-front development costs, accompanied by relatively low production
costs. Further, the life of a particular microprocessor is limited because
obsolescence occurs so quickly, often within two or three years after a chip
is introduced. The “refresh cycles” that occur whenever the need for a new
processor chip arises gives rivals an opportunity to bid anew for a particular
buyer’s business and to offer discounts or rebates similar to or more
aggressive than Intel’s. The opinion in the European Union’s recent action
against Intel found that these refresh cycles are typically less than a year.80
The fact of high fixed costs means that the total cost of producing
microprocessors is exceptionally sensitive to the volume of chips that are
produced during that chip model’s product life. To illustrate, suppose that
development costs of a particular chip are $100 and production costs are $1
per chip. If such a firm were to sell ten chips, total costs would be $10 for
fixed costs, plus $1, for a breakeven price of $11. If the firm were to sell 20
chips the minimum price would be $6. And if it were to sell 100 chips the
breakeven price would be $2, that is, $1 per chip to cover fixed costs and
$1 to cover production costs. In short, a guarantee of higher volume
permits the firm to offer vastly lower prices over the chip’s lifetime. But the
seller must typically bid out the price for most of the chips sold at the
beginning of each demand cycle. The greater the output it can confidently
predict, the lower a price it can afford to bid.
This set of facts gives a kind of quasi-natural monopoly quality to a
microprocessor chip with a given set of performance characteristics. It
would be cheaper for one firm to produce the entire production run than it
would be for two firms innovating separately to develop competing chips.
That result is at least somewhat borne out by the competitive history
between Intel and AMD. While the two firms are clearly competitors, they
tend to make chips with different capabilities and designed for different
market niches. Indeed, the two firms compete by differentiating their
products much more than casual buyers think, even though, at a general
level, they are said to be compatible with one another.
Intel, as a chip seller bidding an upfront price, faces two sets of risks.81
One is the risk of a general market downturn, which will reduce chip
demand. The other is the risk that the buyer, having a firm contract price,
will shop the contract around and get a little lower price elsewhere.
A seller like Intel can improve the attractiveness of its package if it bears
the first type of risk—that is, the market risk—itself. This is why it tends to
80. See the Commission Decision, dated 13.05.2009, relating to a proceeding under Article 82 of
the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement, case COMP/C-3/37.900, Intel, paras. 1017–18,
1028, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ICT/intel_provisional_decision.pdf
[hereinafter Intel Commission Decision].
81. Id. para. 1019 (noting unreliability of predictions).
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use market share discounts rather than quantity discounts. A quantity
discount attaches to a specified number of chips, and if the market becomes
weak and the computer maker’s sales fall below that number, the computer
maker must pay the higher price. By contrast, a market share discount
attaches to, say, 90% of the buyer’s sales, whatever they happen to be. So
the market share discount offers the computer maker the lower price, even
if the market becomes weak, provided that the computer maker purchases
its requisite percentage of chips from the seller.
Risks that the chip buyer will try to get other sellers to undersell the
contract are a different matter. This behavior is completely within the
control of the computer makers, and Intel cannot bid a price whose
profitability depends on a high volume of sales unless it can be assured that
this high volume will materialize. Further, it knows that its purchasers are
rational maximizers of their own profits as well. As a result, Intel predicts
that, if given the opportunity, the buyers will ditch the dominant firm’s
contract in order to get a lower price elsewhere if they are able to. If Intel’s
price includes a significant fixed cost component, as it must if the overall
price is to be profitable, then a rival will be able to bid a lower price on a
chip it is already producing. As long as that price is above average variable
cost, it will be profitable to the rival and will steal Intel’s sales. The
customer will then end up purchasing a far lower number of chips than Intel
initially contemplated. The loyalty discount serves both to penalize the
behavior and to force the customer to share part of the cost to Intel of
reduced chip sales that result from the customer’s own choice.
These facts can be particularly problematic if one looks at the relief that
the FTC is requesting in its complaint. The complaint requests that Intel be
forbidden from using “threats, bundled prices, quantity discounts, and other
offers to encourage exclusivity or to deter competition or unfairly raise the
price of its microprocessors . . .” with a presumption that a discount
condition reaching more than 60% of a reseller’s historical purchases is
anticompetitive.82 The order may also prohibit Intel from requiring
customers to “purchase a minimum or fixed volume or percentage of the
customer’s overall . . . requirements from Intel (regardless of whether such
fixed percentage relates to a product line for customers with multiple
product lines or on a company-wide basis)[.]”83
The suggested relief also requires Intel to set its prices above its costs,
with “cost” defined to include an unspecified amount, or “multiple,” of
fixed costs as well as all variable costs.84 Exactly how this portion of the
82. Complaint, supra note 67, at 19.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 21. The mandate reads:
Prohibiting Intel from pricing its microprocessors so that the incremental price to a
customer of microprocessors or GPUs sold in competition with another competitor is
below cost when such price includes all rebates, payments, or other price decreases
on other products not in competition. Pricing will be presumed to be below cost even
if it exceeds Intel’s average variable cost but does not contribute to its fixed sunk
costs in an appropriate multiple of that average variable cost. Pricing or sale of kit or
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relief would be implemented is unclear. However, once fixed-cost
investments have been sunk, a firm typically profits by making any sale it
would otherwise forego where the price is higher than incremental or
variable cost. The more the firm sells, the lower the fixed costs will be on a
per unit basis. This behavior has nothing to do with monopoly and is a
fundamental ingredient in firm rationality. For example, a highly competitive
small airline knows that if the additional costs of carrying an extra
passenger in an otherwise empty seat are $50, any price higher than $50
will contribute to the carrier’s bottom line. It does not matter that the price
is insufficient to cover a per seat allocation of the cost of the mortgage on
the plane or the firm’s real estate or even the pilot’s salary.
As a result, tiered pricing is common among both dominant and
competitive air carriers, and the key to competitiveness and profits is higher
total output.85 In sum, requiring a firm to include a government-mandated
“multiple” of fixed costs in addition to variable costs in its bid price is to
force it to behave irrationally. Indeed, it would make it likely that Intel
would lose any bid against an equally efficient competitor simply because it
was unable to bid its lowest profitable price.
The proposal that Intel not be permitted to offer discounts tagged to
purchases exceeding 60% of a purchaser’s historical needs recalls fact
findings in the European Intel decision, which distinguished between the
“noncontestable” and “contestable” portions of Intel’s output to any given
customer.86 The logic of this analysis is, while an equally efficient rival can
ordinarily match any above-cost discount, it may not be able to match the
lost discount on that portion of a customer’s purchases that are
noncontestable; that is, those portions that the customer must purchase
from Intel no matter what. For example, if the noncontestable portion of
sales to some customer is, say, 60%, then the firm that wants to match a
discount that requires a 90% purchase is not going to be able to sell this
firm more than 40% of its needs in any event. Further, it must not only
match the discount on the number of chips that it is able to sell, but it must
also compensate the customer for the foregone discount on the chips that it
is not able to sell, and for which the customer, having lost the discount,
bundled products will be presumed to be above “cost” if the “kit” or “bundle”
includes an x86 product or, if it does, if, after all discounts have attributed to the
competitive product(s) in the bundle, the resulting pricing is well above Intel’s
average variable cost plus a contribution to Intel’s fixed sunk costs in an appropriate
multiple of that average variable cost.
Id.
85. The social efficacy of this kind of pricing has been well known in price theory for well over a
century. See JOHN MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923); see
generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad
Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017 (1988) (noting how railroad shippers charging lower rates for larger
shippers reflected the lower costs of selling in larger volumes—not price discrimination). On the current
law, mainly in the context of predatory pricing cases, see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 70, ¶¶
736–37, 742.
86. Intel Commission Decision, supra note 80, paras. 1255–59 (discussing Dell’s incontestable
share of Intel purchases).
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must now pay the higher price.87
The analysis of such deals is similar to that for bundled discounts, where
the rival makes only one of the two products in the bundle. The European
Commission condemned Intel’s discounts of this type under an “attribution”
test roughly analogous to the one that has been applied in some U.S. courts
for bundled discounts. The test works something like this: Suppose that,
because Intel is dominant in the industry, a computer manufacturer needs to
purchase at least 50% of its chips from Intel; the rest it might be able to get
from competitors. However, Intel uses a market share discount scheme that
gives the computer maker a discount only if it purchases 90% of its chips
from Intel. In that case, if the firm wanted to purchase as much as, say,
25% of its chips from a rival, it would lose the discount on the 50% of the
“noncontestable” chips; so the rival would not only have to match Intel’s
discounted price on the chips actually sold to the rival, but it would also
have to compensate the customer for the lost discount on the 50% of
noncontestable chips. On these hypothetical numbers, it would take a
discount three times bigger than Intel’s discount for the rival to take the
sale.88 The attribution test “attributes” the discount on all units to the sales
that the rival is able to make and then considers whether the size of this
discount is so large that it would drive the effective price below cost.89
The test is critically dependent on a finding that a specific percentage of
Intel’s output is noncontestable, and a few points variation can make the
test come out differently. Further, the question whether any output is
contestable is very sensitive to price. That is, Intel cannot charge an
infinitely high price even for the noncontestable portion of its output;
rather, it is contestable only in the sense that at a given price the computer
manufacturer has a strong preference for Intel chips over the alternatives.
Further, depending on how the FTC’s proposed remedy is applied, it
may put Intel in a position of not being able to bid more aggressively for the
“contestable” part of its output than for the “noncontestable” part.90 Once a
firm’s fixed cost investment has been made and sales are underway, any sale
87. For example, suppose a customer’s “noncontestable” share of purchases from the dominant
firm is 60%, and the dominant firm gives a 10% discount to whoever purchases at least 90% of its
needs from it. A rival has the same costs and would like to bid for the 40% of contestable demand, but it
would also have to compensate the customer for the lost 10% discount on the 60% of incontestable
purchases. Effectively, it would have to give a 25% discount, assuming that it could then capture the
entire 40% of contestable purchases.
88. Intel Commission Decision, supra note 80, paras. 1002–07,1154–55; Damien Geradin, The
Decision of the Commission of 13 May 2009 in the Intel Case: Where is the Foreclosure and
Consumer Harm? 7–8 (Tilburg L.& Econ. Ctr, Working Paper Series, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1490114.
89. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 70, ¶ 749; Herbert Hovenkamp & Erik Hovenkamp,
Complex Bundled Discounts and Antitrust Policy, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1227, 1232–33 (2009); Erik
Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusionary Bundled Discounts and the Antitrust Moderniation
Commission, 53 ANTITRUST BULL. 517, 520 (2008).
90. Perhaps Intel could tell buyers that if they take the incontestable portion of their output from
Intel at, say, $100 per unit, it will sell them additional units at $90; but this would still look like a
discount conditioned on the buyer taking a minimum market share from Intel.
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of an additional unit at a price above average variable cost is profitable to
the firm. Further, this rule applies even if a certain range of output is
incontestable. Having sold those units at the market price, incremental sales
at any price above incremental cost are rational. An order forcing Intel to
charge more will be difficult to administer, will force Intel to avoid putting
low-cost output on the market, and will be unlikely to increase competition.
Further, it ignores the basic economic truth that price discrimination is
virtually inevitable and typically procompetitive in markets with high fixed
costs.91
One possibility that the FTC must consider is that a remedy that forbids
Intel from competing aggressively will produce duopoly or collusion rather
than competition. I noted before that the social cost of false positives in
cease and desist orders can be less than the cost of substantial treble
damages actions.92 But this limitation does not apply to every cease and
desist order, and some might do more harm than good by facilitating
collusion or collusion-like behavior.93 In this case, and at least in the CPU
market, once Intel is forbidden from taking advantage of above-cost
discounts or engaging in aggressive pricing, it may very well reach a
comfortable equilibrium with its rival AMD, which will give both firms
good profits and no incentive to deviate downward. This is not a prediction
that price fixing will occur but simply an observation that in a two-firm
market with high fixed costs, the firms will tend to track each other’s
output and pricing. The result could be that they reach a relatively stable
price level that is well above their costs, at least until a new entrant forces
them to compete harder. In that case, the goal of turning AMD into a
91. When fixed costs are high, market share or quantity discounts can serve a purpose similar to
that of two-part tariffs, which approach more efficient output by using one price component to represent
an allocation of fixed costs and the other variable costs. For example, a firm with $100 in upfront fixed
costs and $1 in variable costs might charge customers a $10 fee to cover a pro rata share of fixed costs
and $1 in per unit costs. In that case, a customer who bought 10 units would end up paying $2 per unit;
one who bought 50 units would end up paying $1.20, etc. That is, the more the customer purchased,
the less it would pay on a per unit basis. Indeed, two-part tariffs are often implemented by the offering
of a number of alternative “bundles” whose per unit price varies inversely with the number of units that
the customer purchases. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 143–49
(1988); see generally Sreya Kolay, Greg Shaffer & Janusz A. Ordover, All-Units Discounts in Retail
Contracts, 13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 429 (2004) (discussing how large-volume discounts create
more profit than the typical two-part tariffs); Patrick Greenlee, David Reitman, & David S. Sibley, An
Antitrust Analysis of Bundled Loyalty Discounts 10–11 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice Econ. Analysis Group,
Working
Paper
EAG
04-13,
2004),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/single_firm/docs/220345.htm; Bruce H. Kobayashi, The
Economics of Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Law in the United States 5 (George Mason Univ. Law
& Econ., Working Paper Series, No. 05-26), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf
m?abstract_id=794944.
92. See discussion supra p. 24.
93. A well known example is FTC v. A. E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 324 U.S. 746 (1945),
where the Supreme Court upheld an FTC order that effectively required one firm to investigate into a
competitor’s prices in order to qualify for the Robinson-Patman Act’s “meeting competition” defense.
Id. at 758.
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profitable competitor will have been achieved but at consumers’ expense.
The GPU market has more rivals, including AME as well as Nvidia, but,
even here, an order forcing the largest producer to hold its prices above its
optimal level may end up doing more harm than good.
V. CONCLUSION
There are good reasons for the Commission to use § 5 of the FTC Act
to reach more broadly than the Sherman Act has reached, and the reasons
pertain to both procedure and substance. But when § 5 is used to further
competition policy, it must not be interpreted so as to undermine
competition goals, which are high output of high quality products and low
consumer prices. One reading the Intel complaint fears that the FTC is on a
course toward the same set of mistakes that it made in the 1960s, when it
used § 5 to protect rival businesses at consumers’ expense.
To be sure, this complaint contains allegations that go beyond Intel’s
market-share discounts, including claims of untruthful behavior about the
performance of Intel’s products, calculated to induce customers to stay
with Intel rather than going to a rival. These may well deserve
condemnation, although it is not obvious that application of § 5 of the FTC
Act is necessary. For example, the government’s Sherman Act case against
Microsoft included claims of untruthful statements made to software
developers in order to shore up Microsoft’s position by convincing the
developers that their products would work with any operating system when
it in fact worked only with Microsoft Windows.94 The court had no
difficulty condemning these claims under the Sherman Act when the
necessary connection between the conduct and Microsoft’s market
dominance was established.95 If the FTC is proceeding as an antitrust
enforcer, whether under the Sherman Act or the FTC Act, it must show
that the deception, in some way, contributed to the creation or maintenance
of monopoly power. Of course, the FTC can also proceed against fraud in
its consumer protection role, and in that case, it can obtain an injunction
against deceptive conduct without showing a link to monopoly.
At this stage, the FTC deserves the benefit of the doubt. Complaints are
invariably drafted broadly, and the issues and scope of relief narrow during
the adjudication process. That will, undoubtedly, happen in the Intel case as
well. But the opportunity to take advantage of its special status in order to
make good, consumer-regarding antitrust policy is one that the FTC should
not lose. An injunction against practices that are clearly exclusionary and
have little social value is one thing, but an order requiring Intel to refrain
from bidding aggressively for additional sales in the way that any rational
firm would is likely to benefit mainly Intel’s rivals at consumers’ expense.

94. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
95. Id. at 77–78.

